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I. Introduction - War and Poverty in SSA
•  War is largest single cause of poverty
• True whether consumption headcount, access to basic services, malnutrition, 
premature death and/or GDP is criterion
• Therefore treatment as noises offstage or a distant cause acting through standard 
mechanisms is intellectually and operationally unsound.
II. War, Civil Disorder —» Poverty: Some Mechanisms
• Loss of output - destroyed/isolated.
• Loss of livelihood - output/input/transport/market contraction.
• Loss of basic services - access for users/suppliers, access to finance.
•  Loss o f safety nets - transport gaps and fiscal erosion.
• Loss of investment and, therefore, present and future output (largest cost in
broad/long-lasting war).
• Loss o f life - direct combatant casualties, bystanders, targeted civilians, losers of 
health-water-food access, displaced persons, victims of genocide.
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• Not limited to war zones at any one time nor exempting unaffected zones (general 
fiscal and economic malaise and loss of markets and inputs e.g. Maputo).
• Varies with scope, length o f war and strategies/instruments used - terrorising 
rural residents into flight while targeting basic services, transport, safety nets 
(RENAMO) or isolating cities to starve out by seeding fields and access routes 
with mines (UNITA) particularly damaging. Levels o f distrust and of attempts by 
left out or losers to reverse mediated or military settlement (e.g. Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda) affect speed and degree of poverty decline and of rebuilding 
social and political structures and links to sustain it.
• Violent conflicts in specific, bounded areas (e.g. Burnt Valley in Kenya, eastern 
portion Ghana's Northern Region) or at levels short o f war (South African 
townships over 1988-92) can have costs to those directly affected analogous to 
war.
• Military expenditure for deterrent (e.g. Tanzania army on Western Borders, 
Botswana forces to 1992) or regional security (e.g. Zimbabwe/Tanzania in 
Mozambique 1980's; Botswana in Lesotho) do have poverty price via opportunity 
cost to basic services and infrastructure spending. In time o f actual war on home 
soil direct military costs are absolutely and relative to budget larger, but are 
secondary to output, livelihood, access, safety net elements in overall impact.
III. War - Society - State: Debilitation and Resurgence
• "Failed states" often precede (as opposed to flowing from) war e.g. Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Zaire. In these cases they are an "early warning" and, to some degree, a 
cause.
• War does not necessarily cause state failure in government controlled zones - e.g. 
Mozambique, Angola, (Derg) Ethiopia, Southwest Africa/Namibia, Rhodesia. 
When it does, it is a not so early warning that "the end is nigh" for that 
state/regime (e.g. Zaire, Somalia the Doughboy's Liberia) unless rescued by
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external forces (e.g. ECOMOG in Sierra Leone) linked to some real domestic 
base (e.g. the 'National Guard' i.e. Kamajors).
• Most wars debilitate and cripple the state - especially in respect to articulated 
institutional capacity, coverage and operational ability though sometimes less so 
in relation to strategy and conceptualisation. The same is normally true o f social 
organisations and of linkages among them. The exceptions are wars perceived 
(especially by 'winners') as national liberation struggles (e.g. Somaliland, 
Eritrea, South Africa, Namibia, to a degree Mozambique and Ethiopia for Tigrean 
- Oromo - Somali Ethiopians) which can have net positive state and society 
building impact.
IV. What Is To Be Done?
• Comprehend and Master Conflict Basic but largely beyond scope of this lecture. 
Poverty as such rarely key cause of war. Resource scarcity (e.g. land, water) 
related to poverty may be.
• Alleviate (Safety Net) consumption and service access poverty for war effected 
during war.
• Preserve ability to produce/habit of earning livelihood of displaced, refugees to 
maximum degree possible during war (cuts against whole thrust of official 
refugee practice and against using large displaced person camps or locating in 
cities). Such efforts (including work for food employment) are analogous to 
"trampoline" type safety nets during drought to preserve capacity to bounce back 
when rain (or in this case peace) returns.
• Reconstruction (social), Reconciliation (political), (Rehabilitation economic) 
after peace in all or most of country with specific attention to gaps/losses created 
by war (e.g. in Rwanda genocidal conflagration left human and institutional gaps 
plus specific poverty groups - widows, orphans, disabled - rather than massive 
destruction of physical infrastructure/director production fixed capital).
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V. How Feasible? How Economic?
• War period safety nets, trampolines are accepted. Execution hard and finance 
scarce (especially for displaced or pauperised in place as contrasted with 
refugees). Problem is devising ways to implement (and doing so) and in 
convening donors (or Treasury) to finance. Mozambique small, rural displaced 
camp or 'resettlement' approach shows possibilities/limitations.
• R-R-R is no less demanding of new thinking and priorities domestically than 
wartime predecessor, but also no harder to design, operate than overall broad 
(personal consumption/service access/oppression avoidance/vulnerability 
reduction/safety net) strategies. But macro economists are not used to treating 
conflict derived poverty and its reversal as a core economic element, while 
donors, to date, are still less inclined to do so. Further, refugee support and 
calamity relief funds are usually redeployed elsewhere not transferred - at least for 
an interim period - to R-R-R. The World Bank and UNHCR (by following 
traditional analytical and operational approaches which for post war, war 
pauperised people are "dusty roads to death") bear a heavy responsibility for this 
generic blindness. The example of Mozambique which over 1990-94 sought to 
float an R-R-R focused post-war economic strategy but found it was ignored (not 
even debated and rejected) is instructive. In a positive sense it (and experience in 
Somaliland) do demonstrate the macroeconomic importance o f R-R-R and the 
potential value of backing market access and security led poverty reduction with 
specific infrastructure, basic service and (perhaps) selective capital access 
measures.
[The title's allusion is to the traditional Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse - War, Pestilence, 
Famine and Death. A Southern African analogue - but specifically drought related - is the Lower 
Limpopo Valley saying "When the Great River runs dry the end of the world is at hand." In 
1992 the Lower Limpopo did run dry and until dearth relief began to deliver the end o f the world 
was a real danger for the valley dwellers.]
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